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lN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
ROCKE'T MINING CORPORATION, a
U t ah corporation, and PIONEER
CARISSA GOLD MINES, INC., a
Wyoming corporation,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

vs.
RULAN J. GILL, LENORE M. GILL,
RAY GILL, ANGELO M. BILLIS,
HERMAN F. LUND and T. W.
BILL IS,

Case No.

12174

Defendants-Respondents.

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
The action in the lower court was brought by two
merged corporations against one of the corporation's former officers, directors and shareholders for fraudulently
and unlawfully disbursing corporate assets to themselves
and others and then abandoning the corporation.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The Third Judicial District Court, the Honorable Gordon R. Hall presiding, granted judgment against plaintiffsappellants.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiffs-appellants seek to have this Court reverse
the judgment of the lower court and direct entry of judgment for plaintiffs-appellants.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The statement of facts is divided into numbered paragraphs to facilitate referencing. Appellants will be referred
to in some instances as "Rocket" and "Pioneer". Respondents ·Will be referred to as "defendants" and by name
where appropriate. When reference is made to the minutes
of Rocket, citation will be made to the record, exhibit number and date of the minutes.
Rocket commenced business in the summer of 1955.
Defendants Rulan J. (R. J.) Gill, Herman F. Lund and
Ray Gill were present at the organizational meeting of the
coroporation. (R-298, Ex. P-2, Min. 7-10-55). Defendant
Angelo M. (A. M.) Billis was active in the affairs of the
corporation from its beginning. (R-368-369, 542). Defendants Lenore Gill and T. W. Billis were directors of Rocket
for some time during the period when defendants were
operating Rocket. (R-298. Ex. P-2, Min. 12-26-57; see minutes generally).
1.

2. In November, 1956, Rocket by contract arranged
to purchase and took possession of the assets, including a
mill for processing ore, from Pioneer for stock and cash.
(R-298, Ex. P-2, Min. 11-7-56). The amount owed by
Rocket to Pioneer on said contract was never fully paid and
later became the subject of a lawsuit in the Federal court.
(See paragraph 14 below.)

3. Shortly after incorporation Rocket became a public
corporation by making a federal Regulation "A" public
offering of 30 million shares, of which 3,000,000 shares
were sold for one cent each through a Salt Lake broker.
The offering was voluntarily terminated by defendants in
January, 1956. (R-379-81).
4. After stopping the public offering in January,
1956, defendants sold some of their own stock over the
counter prior to April 2, 1956, at prices in excess of the
public offering. (R-375-78). On April 2, 1956, defendants
were informed by the Securities and Exchange Commission
that the S.E.C. did not consider the offering then terminated. (Ex. P-10). Defendants did not act on the S.E.C.
letter and sell more of the corporation's stock to raise necessary capital for Rocket, but continued to sell their own
stock. (R-375). During this period defendants made Rocket
a debtor by loaning Rocket proceeds they received from the
sale of their own stock and by loaning some of their stock
back to the corporation to then be sold, ostensibly to provide operating capital. (R-377, 381; also see R-392, 388).
5. Prior to making the public offering the defendants
submitted to the Securities Commission of the State of
Utah a prospectus which "\Vas approved by said Commission
and maJfe a part of the registration statement filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission. Said prospectus
states on page 5 that
No salaries or other compensation shall be paid directly or indirectly to officers, directors or promoters of issuer other than Secretary-Treasurer who
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will receive $75.00 per month until issuer's mining
operations are on a paying basis.
The directors of Rocket approved. (R-298, Ex. P-4, Min.
8-10-55).
6. In the summer of 1956, the stockholders of Rocket
voted to establish a Board of Directors of seven. ( P-298,
Ex. P-2, Min. 7-17-56). The stockholders elected four persons to the Board and left three vacancies to be filled by
the four directors elected. These vacancies were never
filled. (On February 27, 1957, the articles of incorporation
of Rocket were amended to provide for a board of seven
directors.) (R-298, Ex. P-7, Min. 2-27-57). Rocket appar·
ently never had any bylaws.
7. On December 14, 1956, the following four directors
-R. J. Gill, Lenore Gill (R. J. Gill's wife), Ray Gill (father
of R. J. Gill) and Walter Pesseto-were present (according
to the minutes) and voted to pay A. M. Billis and R. J. Gill
monthly salaries of $700 and $750 respectively commencing
January 1, 1957. (R-298, Ex. P-2, Min. 12-14-56).
8. Although Walter J. Pessetto is listed in the minutes of Rocket as attending a number of directors' meetings, Mr. Pessetto denies ever attending any such meetings.
(R-409-12).
9. Pursuant to the resolution passed by the directors
on December 14, 1956, Rocket paid to R. J. Gill and A. M.
Billis $17,400 in salaries. (In 1965 the lower court granted
summary judgment against R. J. Gill and A. M. Billis for
that amount for the salaries improperly paid to them be-

cause Rocket's business was never on a paying basis; said
judgment was upheld on appeal by this Court. Rocket Mining Corporation v. Gill and Billis, 18 Utah 2d 104, 417 P.
2d 120 (1966) .) (Since Rocket's operations were not on a
paying basis, it appears that the money used for salaries
paid Gill and Billis at least partially must have come from
the loans mentioned in paragraph 4 above made to Rocket
by defendants. Thus, defendants apparently indebted
Rocket to provide themselves illegal salaries.)
10. On July 5, 1957, the accountants for Rocket submitted a "Certificate of Examination" of Rocket's balance
sheet to the Board of Directors of Rocket, which showed
Rocket as having an approximate net asset value above
liabilities of $500,000. The assets included the mill which
Pioneer had transferred to Rocket. (Ex. P-11).
11. On December 26, 1957, a special directors meeting was held pursuant to waiver of notice. This waiver of
notice was signed by only three directors, R. J. Gill, Lenore
Gill and T. W. Billis, the brother of A. M. Billis. (R-298,
Ex. P-2, Min. 12-26-57). At the said meeting the only directors stated to be present in the minutes were R. J. Gill,
Lenore Gill, Ray Gill and 'I'. W. Billis. The vacancies existing on the board had not been filled and the board was
operating with fewer directors than the seven required by
the articles of incorporation. At this meeting the above
directors resolved to sell the corporation's interest in the
Rim Group of claims for $130,000 and to divide the proceeds principally among defendants as repayment of loans,

including the above mentioned loans of stock to Rocket. (R298, Ex. P-2, Min. 12-26-57; R-388).
12. Pursuant to said resolution Rocket sold its interest in the said claims on January 14, 1958, for $130,000.
Cashier's checks were made payaLle to defendants and
others in the manner stated in the minutes, except that that
$130,000 was never placed in Rocket's bank account. (R298, E.x. P-9, R-390-391).
13. Defendants R. J. Gill and A. M. Billis thereafter
sold their majority stock interest in Rocket to one Roy
Cram, who apparently then assumed control of the operation and assets of Rocket. (R-393-394). (R. J. Gill and
A. M. Billis apparently owned over 60% of the outstanding
stock of Rocket at this time. (Calculation which includes
3,000,000 shares sold to public was made from figures contained in Ex. P-1, which includes Offering Circular of one
cent offering and letter of Robert W. Hughes dated 10-2055.) R. J. Gill does not knmv what Cram paid him for his
stock, has no records and did not call a corporate meeting
to authorize the transfer of control of Rocket to Cram.
A. M. Billis is sure that the total amount paid both Gill and
Billis together for their stock wasn't $6,000. (R-571).
14. Becaue Rocket still owed Pioneer on its contract
for the assets sold to Rocket as mentioned in paragraph 2
above, and because certain of the assets had been apparently removed and disposed of, Pioneer sued Rocket in the
Federal Court in Salt Lake City and all assets, plus substantially all the stock of Rocket, were adjudged in 1960
to be the property of Pioneer. (R-298, Ex. D-29, R-420).
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15. After the said judgment of the Federal Court was
entered, it was discovered, when the assets, books and records of Rocket were turned over to Pioneer, that some of
the assets were in fact missing and the books and records
were not complete (as an example see Ex. P-8), and that
the individual defendants may have engaged in unauthorized, fraudulent and unlawful acts while in control of
Rocket, thus causing the assets to be transferred, lost, sold
or otherwise depleted. (R-420).
16. The present action was commenced in the name
of Rocket in September, 1961. Pioneer was later joined and
Pioneer and Rocket were merged and the action continued
in the name of both corporations.
17. Before trial in the lower court, it was stipulated
that the issues to be resolved were:
(a) Whether defendants wrongfully terminated
the public offering of Rocket stock and are therefore
liable to the plaintiffs for damages caused thereby.
(b) Whether defendants unlawfully distributed
corporate assets to themselves and others and are liable
for all damages proximately arising therefrom.
( c) Whether defendants unlawfully distributed
to themselves and others the $130,000 received from
the sale of the Rim Group of claims and are therefore
liable for said sum.

8

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
BECAUSE THERE WERE ONLY FOUR
RECTORS OF AN AUTHORIZED BOARD OF
SEVEN AND 'fHE DEFENDANTS AS DIRECTORS WERE PERSONALLY INTERESTED IN
ANJ? VOTED FOR DISTRIBUTION OF THE
$130,000, THERE COULD NOT BE A PROPER
QUORUM PRESENT, AND ANY SUCH DISTRIBUTION WAS UNLAWFUL, AND DEFENDANTS ARE THEREFORE LIABLE FOR THE
AMOUNT SO DISTRIBUTED.
The Utah statute pertaining to the number of directors
to constitute a quorum is Section 16-10-38, U.C.A. (Repl.
Vol. 1953), which states as follows:
A majority of the number of directors fixed by the
bylaws, or in the absence of a bylaw fixing the number of directors, then of the number stated in the
articles of incorporation, shall constitute a quorum
for the transaction of business unless a greater number is required by the articles of incorporation or
the bylaws. The act of a majority of the directors
present at a meeting at which a quorum is present
shall be the act of the board of directors, unless the
act of a greater number is required by the articles
of incorporation or the bylaws.
It is undisputed that seven directors were required to

constitute a full board for Rocket. It is also undisputed
that no more than four directors of Rocket were present
at directors' meetings wherein action was taken, about

which action appellants complain. By the above statute, it
is clear that under ordinary circumstances a minimum of
four directors could have conducted the regular business
of Rocket. There is no explicit statutory provision concerning circumstances where a director has an adverse interest. The articles of incorporation are likewise silent on
this issue. The difficulty arises because of the nature of
the action taken and the identity and interests of those
four directors. At the meeting of December 26, 1957, at
which the $130,000 was authorized to be disbursed, the
directors present were R. J. Gill, Lenore Gill, Ray Gill and
T. W. Billis. Of the $130,000 R. J. Gill was to and did receive approximately $42,000 and A. M. Billis was to and
did receive approximately $35,000. Of the directors present
at that meeting, R. J. Gill and Lenore Gill were husband
and wife, and Ray Gill was the father of R. J. Gill. T. W.
Billis was the brother of A. M. Billis.
It is well settled that a director cannot act for a cor-

poration in a matter in which he has an adverse interest
and cannot be counted in determining whether or not a
quorum exists, even though he does not vote on the particular matter of business. 19 Am. Jur. 2d, Corporations, §
1128; Colorado Management Corp. v. American Founders
Life Insurance Co., 359 P. 2d 665 (Colo. 1961); Adams v.
Mid-west Chevrolet Cmp., 179 P. 2d 147 (Okla. 1947).
In Hotaling v. Hotalfr1g, 224 Pac. 455, 458 (Cal. 1924),
the board of directors consisted of five members. Three of
the board were present at the meeting and one of the members present had an interest in the transaction adverse to
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the corporation. The court in holding that the transaction
was void stated :
Being personally interested in this transaction adversely to the corporation he was disqualified thereby to vote the authorization, and his presence could
not be counted to 1nakc a quorum for that purpose.
(Emphasis added.)
At pages 513 and 514, H urnstein, Corporation Law and
Practice, Section 415, it is stated:
At directors meetings, the percentage requirement
for a quorum is ordinarily tested against the total
number of directors authorized to constitute a full
board, regardless of vacancies.
A director with an adverse interest in a transaction
to be voted upon will not be counted toward a
quorum unless the statute or charter or by-laws
expressly provide the contrary. This general rule
conforms to and implements the principal that an
interested director may not vote.
Of the four directors present at the meeting of December 26, 1957, director R. J. Gill was obviously interested in the payment of $42,000 to him. Certainly his wife,
Lenore Gill, also a director, was as interested in that payment as R. J. Gill was. Even ignoring the fact that director
Ray Gill was the father of R. J. Gill and that T. W. Billis
was the brother of A. M. Billis and assuming that they
were not influenced Ly their blood relationship, there could
be at most two disinterested directors who could vote. Moreover, if R. J. Gill could not be counted to establish a quorum,
then there was no quorum present and the remaining three
directors, even if total disinterest on their part could be
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absolutely proven, could not lawfully act for Rocket. Thus,
the disbursement of the $130,000 appears patently unlawful.
In addition to the fact that no lawful quorum was

present in this case, the action of the directors of Rocket
in voting to liquidate one of the principal and vital assets
of the corporation (See Ex. P-11) and to pay the alleged
indebtedness to themselves is contrary to fundamental corporate law. A director or oif1cer of a corporation is a
fiduciary and o\ves the highest duty to the stockholders of
the corporation and to the corporation whose properties
and business he manages. He has no right to dispose of
vital corporate assets not in the ordinary course of business
for the primary purpose of paying a claim which he has
against the corporation unless that right is granted by
virtue of stockholder action, or, at the very least, by resolution of a disinterested quorum of directors. A director has
the same duty that a trustee has to his Cestui Que Trust.
The above rules have been expounded numerous times by
all courts, including this Court. Cox v. Berry, 19 Utah 2d
352, 431 P. 2d 575 (1967). This Court has also stated that
improper dealings of corporate management will be set
apart on slight grounds. Hansen v. Granite Holding Co.,
117 Utah 530, 218 P. 2d 274 (1950).
In Ashman v. M'iller, 101 F. 2d 85 (6th Cir. 1939), the

Federal Court of Appeals defined this duty as follows:
A director of a corporation occupies a fiduciary relation to it and its stockholders. This position is
one of trust and he is frequently denominated a

trustee and so held accountable in equity. The ordinary trust relationship of directors of a corporation and stockholders is not a matter of statuto1·y
or technical law. It springs from the fact that directors have the control and guidance of corporate
business affa1 rs and property and hence the property interests of the stockholders. Equity recognizes
that stockholders are the proprietors of the corporate interests and are ultimately the only beneficiar*
ies thereof *
In Modern Corporation Law by Oleck, Vol. 2, §§ 959960, the author defines the duties o:f a director as follows:
Directors, as the central power of management,
stand in a fiduciary capacity to the body of shareholders and their economic interests. * * * Ingrained in this fiduciary relationship are two important touchstones of conduct to which Equity
holds directors in their management of corporation
affairs. These criteria are: ( 1) the highest loyalty
to the mterests of the corporation; (2) at least reasonable care and business prudence . . . directors
must not act for their own financial benefit, but
must act solely for the benefit of the shareholders
of the corporation. p. 730.
The author goes on to state:
. . . all profits made by directors through furtive
dealings involving the transaction of corporate
affairs or which involve a conflict of personal interest and fidelity to the interests of the company must
be accounted for by the directors to the company.
p. 731.
Whenever there is undisputed evidence of the breach
of duty on the part of a fiduciary in handling funds en-
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trusted to him, a court of equity will order the fiduciary to
account.
In Sorin v. Shahmoon Industr?:es, Inc., 220 N. Y. S. 2d
760 (1961), minority stockholders sued the president and
directors of the corporation demanding and accounting of
their acts in expending corporate funds. The defendants
demurred to the complaint on the ground that they had
never received any funds into their possession which could
be the subject matter of a trust and that they were not
trustees in the sense that would require them to account to
the corporation for authorizing the expenditure of funds
from the corporate treasury. (It should be noted that in
the instant case the defendants did receive a major portion
of the $130,000, which funds were never paid over to the
corporation but which were disbursed directly by the president of Rocket, R. J. Gill, to the promoters and others without it ever reaching the corporate bank account.)
The Sorin court, after considering whether or not a
trust existed, concluded that it did regardless of whether
the defendant directors had actually received funds and
held that the funds and assets of the corporation were in
the hands of the directors in trust for the corporation and
that the directors were obligated to account to the stockholders and the corporation for the handling of said funds.
The court in its opinion on page 778 said:
The defendants argue that the J ersawit case is inapplicable here because Shahmoon was not "entrusted with property" but merely repaid for exexpenses incurred. In my view, the plaintiffs have
the better of this dispute. All of the company funds
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were in effect entrusted to Shahmoon and the directors, and they were fiduciaries of the company
with regard to their disbursement. It is of no consequence whether Shahmoon received the cash before he spent it or advanced it subject to repayment.
He was spending corporate funds and is accountable
for them, as are those directors who acquiesced in
the out-go.
In underscoring the high degree of fiduciary duty owed
by the directors to the corporation and its stockholders, the
court brushed aside the defendant's argument that some
of the items involved in the accounting were so small as
to be de minimus and said on page 779:
The defendants urge that the plaintiff's charges of
wasted millions have degenerated to quibbles over
paltry sums. ·while the amount in question here is
certainly not large in comparison to the company's
volume of business, the duty of a fiduciary does not
extend only to major matters for sul>stantial
amounts over which he has control. It extends to
the last penny with which he is entrusted, even
though any recovery warranted will be relatively
minimal, the maximum of de minimus non curat
lex is inapplicable. This is not a matter of principal,
but of principle. The principle at stake here is simple and ancient: A fiduciary must account for the
funds entrusted to his care - and that means "all
of such funds", not "some" or even "most" of them.
(c.f. In re Hamilton, 24 Misc. 2d 899, 195 N. Y. S.
2d 689.) A reference will be ordered at which
Shahmoon will be held to account for these sums.
/

The defendant directors and promoters in this case
have testified to the effect that the corporation owed them
bona fide debts for salaries, expense accounts, and monies
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advanced to the corporation and for its benefit, and they
contend that they did not breach their duty by resolving
to sell corporate assets vital to the continued operation of
Rocket and not in the ordinary course of business to repay
their said loans and expenses. It should be noted that after
the sale of the Rim Group claims the bulk of Rocket's assets
were subject to its contract with Pioneer. (See Ex. P-11.)
In Sage v. Culver, et al., 41 N. E. 513, 514 ( 1895), an identical situation was presented to the court. Minority stockholders sued the directors for an accounting. The defendant directors owned an overwhelming majority of the
corporate stock. The minority stockholders contended that
the directors had done the same thing that the defendants
in this case did, i.e., they resolved to pay corporate funds
to themselves because of alleged loans made by them to
the corporation. The defendant directors by way of answer
denied that the stockholder plaintiffs were entitled to any
accounting. The court ruled as a matter of law that it was
the duty of the defendants to account.
It is submitted that in this case the undisputed evi-

dence shows that the resolution which the defendants rely
upon as authority for paying out $130,000 of the corporate
funds is a nullity because there was not a disinterested
quorum of directors in existence to authorize the sale of
vital corporate assets not in the ordinary course of business
and payment of the proceeds principally to themselves.
POINT II.
DEFENDANTS TERMINATED THE SALE OF
ROCKET STOCK TO THE PUBLIC, SOLD

/
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THEIR OWN STOCK TO THEIR PROFIT AND
THEN WHEN THEY KNEW THERE WAS A
MARKET FOR ROCKET STOCK AND THAT
THE PUBLIC OFFERING WAS STILL LEGALLY OPEN, THEY WRONGFULLY FAILED
TO SELL MORE OF THE CORPORATION'S
STOCK AND WRONGFULLY ENCUMBERED
ROCKET BY MAKING U NN EC ESSARY
LOANS TO ROCKET AND SHOULD THEREFORE BE REQUIRED TO ACCOUNT.

.

Defendants allege that they terminated the public
offering in January, 1956. However, it is clear from a letter
to Rocket from the United States Securities & Exchange
Commission dated April 2, 1956 (Ex. P-10) that the offering had not actually or officially been terminated as of
that date. It is also clear that between January and April
2, 1956, defendants on at least two occasions sold their own
stock for approximately $45,000 and after April 2, 1956,
sold more stock for at least $15,000. (R-374-78; see Answers to Interrogatories by defendants in October, 1963,
used in cross-examination.)
Defendants deprived the corporation of needed funds
by stopping the public sale of stock when the stock offering
period was legally still in effect. First, defendants took no
positive action to determine from the S.E.C. whether the
offering had officially or legally been terminated; and second, even when they had been notified by the S.E.C. and
knew the offering had not been terminated prior to April
2, 1956 and that there had been a market for the stock
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prior to that date, they took no action to substitute corporate stock for the personal stock they allegedly sold, although it is legally clear that the corporation could have
issued free trading stock during the offering period. Defendants then claim that they loaned stock and some money
to the corporation to provide capital. Thus they made
Rocket a debtor to themselves when there was absolutely no
legal justification for doing so. (R-377-81).
Rocket could have legally and properly issued free
trading replacement stock to defendants during the offering period. Thus the defendants saddled the corporation
with a debt to themselves which was not only wholly unnecessary, but which they had a positive duty to avoid and
absolutely could have avoided. Moreover, it seems elementary that if defendants were able to sell their personal stock
for substantially more than the offering price, they would
have been able to sell much more of the corporation stock
at the much lower offering price.

It is submitted that the stock transactions of defendants, at least during the ofiering period, should be set
aside and defendants be held liable for the amounts allegedly loaned to the corporation and repaid to them.

,1

POINT III.

0

BECAUSE DEFENDANTS EITHER SOLD OR
ALLOWED TO BE SOLD, LOST OR STOLEN,
ASSETS OF ROCKET AND THEN IMPROPERLY SOLD THEIR STOCK AND TURNED
OVER CONTROL OF ROCKET TO A PERSON

e

d
ii
:k

HS

FOR A NOMINAL PRICE WHEN THEY KNEW
THE ASSETS OF ROCKET vVERE OF MUCH
GREATER VALUE, THEY IN EFFECT ABANDONED THE CORPORATION AND VIOLATED
THEIR FIDUCIARY DUTY TO THE STOCKHOLDERS AND ARE THEREFORE LIABLE
FOR THE AMOUNT OF LOSS AS SHOWN ON
THE 'BAL AN C E SHEET OF NELSON &
WATTS.
As is noted in paragraph 13 of the facts, neither R. J.
Gill nor A. M. Billis knew what Roy Cram paid them for
their interest in Rocket, although they were sure it wasn't
even $6,000. Neither has any record of the transaction. It
is interesting to note that this sale took place not more than
a year and perhaps as few as six months after the Rim
Group of claims was sold in 1968 and defendants had received back the money they had allegedly loaned the corporation. (R-393). They did not even have a shareholders
meeting to authorize the sale to Cram. (R-394). In addition, the 1958 accounting of Nelson & Watts (Ex. P-11),
an accounting firm hired by defendants when they controlled Rocket, showed the corporation to have a value far
in excess of the amount defendants received for their interests (R-534-535), even though they then in fact controlled Rocket through their stock ownership. (See paragraph 13 of Facts.)

It is without doubt that in view of such circumstances
the burden is upon defendants to prove their good faith,
fairness and honesty. 19 Am . .Tur. 2d, Corporations, § 1296;
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also see § 1272. R. J. Gill's and A. M. Billis' good faith was
clearly in question ·as a result of their paying themselves
salaries in direct violation of their agreement with the Utah
Securities Commission and their apparent unlawful falsification of corporate records. Corporate minutes were prepared showing Walter Pessetto present and voting at director's meetings. (R-370-372). It was clearly shown by
Pessetto's testimony and by his log books that he had not
been present and could not have been present at said meetings. (R-409-412; Exs. P-13, P-14). His testimony was in
no way refuted.
Because of their fiduciary relationship which defendants held and their very sketchy explanation of their activities in disposing of the corporate assets, it appears they
have not carried their burden of proof as required by law
and should be held liable for the value of the missing assets
as shown by the accounting of Nelson & Watts (Ex. P-11)
and the testimony of George Colemere. (R-420-421, 507508).
CONCLUSION
It is submitted that on each of the issues presented

herein, the facts and law appear conclusive that defendants'
actions were unlawful and that they flagrantly breached
their fiduciary duty toR ocket and its stockholders. The
disbursement of the $130,000 was patently in violation of
law. The unnecessary encumbering of Rocket by defendants was in complete and knowledgeable disregard of the
fact that the public offering was still open. And finally,
the sale of most of the outstanding stock to Cram for what
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was relatively a mere pittance in view of the apparent total
value of Rocket's assets appears at best to be an intentional
and callous breach of defendant's fiduciary duty. The decision of the lower court should be reversed and defendants
required to account.
Respectfully submitted,
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